Introduction
Rocheteau, Rupert and Wright (2007), hereafter RRW, study a model where both unemployment and the role of money have relatively explicit microfoundations. They show that the relationship between anticipated in ‡ation and unemployment need not be zero, even in the long run, as predicted by the theory of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, but may be positive or negative depending on the utility functions of agents. Unemployment in RRW is due to indivisible labor, as in Rogerson (1988) , while the role of money is modeled using the search-and-bargaining approach in Lagos and Wright (2005) . 1 However, RRW are only able to prove their main results for a very special case of the bargaining solution, take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers. As RRW themselves put it, "we can only prove the main results for = 1,...This is somewhat unfortunate, however, since = 1 does preclude many interesting extensions". In particular, when buyers have all the bargaining power, one can never add ex ante investments by sellers, including standard capital accumulation, costly search, or entry-participation decisions by sellers.
This paper develops a similar model, where unemployment is again due to Rogerson's indivisible labor speci…cation, but with a di¤erent assumption concerning the pricing mechanism in decentralized monetary exchanges -I use competitive search, which combines price posting (instead of bargaining) and directed (instead of random) search. 2 There are several reasons why competitive search is an interesting pricing mechanism. First of all, one can argue that in many situations, price posting is more realistic than bargaining, and directed search is more realistic than random search. At the very least, competitive search avoids some criticism of modern monetary theory by people who dispute the appropriateness of random search and bargaining. Second, it is analytically tractable and often allows one to prove stronger or more general results than bargaining models, as is the case in this paper. Third, it is an e¢ cient pricing mechanism: absent distortionary policies, competitive search equilibrium generates the …rst best allocation, while bargaining equilibrium typically does not.
I show that in this model the key results in RRW can be proved without their extreme assumption on the bargaining power parameter. As in RRW, each period consists of a centralized market and a decentralized monetary exchange. Employment takes place only in the centralized market. If goods 1 Cooley and Hansen (1989) earlier study a model with indivisible labor and in ‡ation, but money is introduced via a cash-in-advance constraint, and not with any more explicit microfoundations. Moreover, they only consider price taking, which is perhaps less natural (than price posting and bargaining) once one does try to consider microfoundations for money. They focus on a speci…c parametric utility function, and indeed they do not attempt to prove general theorems, and instead present numerical results. 2 Competitive search is …rst introduced in labor economics by Moen (1997) . It has been used in monetary economics since Rocheteau and Wright (2005 consumed in the centralized market and the decentralized monetary exchange are complements for buyers, in ‡ation reduces consumption in monetary exchange and hence consumption (employment) in the centralized market also decreases. In ‡ation and unemployment have a positive relationship.
However, if goods consumed in the centralized market and the decentralized exchange are substitutes for buyers, in ‡ation reduces unemployment. When the model is generalized to allow both buyers and sellers to have nonseparable preferences, the results in RRW have to be modi…ed. For example, if goods consumed in the centralized market and the decentralized exchange are complements for both buyers and sellers, in ‡ation has opposite e¤ects on buyers and sellers. Therefore, the e¤ect of in ‡ation on aggregate unemployment is ambiguous.
One nice property of competitive search equilibrium is that it endogenously generates implications similar to the ones under the assumption of take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by buyers, but importantly, it does not preclude ex ante investment by sellers, since sellers do not get zero gains from trade here, as the way they do in the RRW bargaining model. As an extension, I consider free entry decisions by sellers. It turns out that free entry does not alter the relationship between in ‡ation and unemployment found previously.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. I solve the competitive search equilibrium and discuss the e¤ect of in ‡ation on unemployment in section 3. Section 4 considers two extensions and Section 5 concludes.
Environment
Time is discrete. A continuum of agents with measure 1 live forever. In each period, there are two subperiods. A Walrasian market (hereafter CM as centralized market) opens in the …rst subperiod.
The second subperiod (hereafter DM as decentralized market) is characterized by decentralized trades. Agents discount at the beginning of each CM at the rate . There is one nonstorable good in each subperiod -a CM good x and a DM good q.
In the CM, each agent is endowed with 1 unit of indivisible labor and trades randomized consumption bundles as in the standard Rogerson (1988) model. The production technology of x is such that one unit of labor is converted into one unit of x. As shown in Rocheteau et al. (2008) , this indivisible labor speci…cation in the CM can replace the quasilinear preference to make the distribution of money holdings tractable.
In the DM, agents are anonymous. There is no production. 3 Instead, all agents are endowed with Throughout this paper, I focus on the case where u j (q; x; h) is separable in (q; x) and h for j = b; s,
Assumptions on f (q; 
Competitive Search Equilibrium
This section begins with solving an agent's problem in the CM and then proceeds to solve an agent's problem in the DM. Finally, I characterize the equilibrium allocation and discuss the relationship between in ‡ation and unemployment.
biguously determined in CM.
CM
Let W (m) be the value function of an agent in the CM with money holding m. Letm h be the money balance that an agent carries to the DM for h 2 f0; 1g. Suppose that agents are employed and consume x 1 with probability`. With probability 1 `, agents are unemployed and consume x 0 .
An agent's value function is
W (m) = max ;x1;x0;m1;m0
where V (m h ; x h ) is the agent's DM value function for h 2 f0; 1g and p is the price of x in the CM.
Let denote the Lagrangian multiplier. The Lagrangian is

L = max
;x1;x0;m1;m0;
Assuming that`2 (0; 1), the …rst order conditions for interior solutions arè
It follows that (2) to (6) determine (m 1 ;m 0 ; x 1 ; x 0 ; ) and (7) pins down`. There are several useful observations. First, the choice of (m 1 ;m 0 ; x 1 ; x 0 ; ) does not depend on m. Only`depends on m in (7). Second, W (m) is linear in m. In particular,
Third, it can be shown that x 1 = x 0 ,m 1 =m 0 and = v(0) v(1). 5 Notice that can be interpreted as the value of leisure. To simplify notations, let x = x 1 = x 0 andm =m 1 =m 0 . Denote the aggregate labor supply by `. From (7), it is immediate that `= x. Furthermore, W (m) is simpli…ed to W (m) = max
DM
Before the preference shock is realized, an agent's expected value function in the DM is . Similarly, the probability for a seller to trade with a buyer is
. Once a buyer and a seller trade, they follow the posted terms (q ! ; d ! ). Therefore, the buyer's consumption in the DM is q + q ! and the seller's consumption is! . Buyers and sellers have the following value functions:
Equilibrium
When designing submarkets, market makers maximize the expected value of an agent who is a buyer in ! such that an agent who is a seller in ! can get the expected market value J: 6 Let W 
Note that market makers announce the terms of trade at the beginning of each period. It implies that agents can take these terms of trade into consideration when they make their choices of money balances in the CM. Lemma 1 states the agent's optimal money balance to carry to the DM.
Lemma 1 In the CM, an agent chooses to bring just enough money balance to make a purchase if the agent becomes a buyer in the DM.
To simplify notations, I de…ne u(q; x) = f ( q + q; x) f ( q; x) and c(q; x) = F ( q; x) F (; x).
Consider …rst the value functions of an agent who is a buyer in !. Before the preference shock is realized, the agent enters into ! as a buyer with probability . With probability 1 , the agent becomes a seller and can enter into! where !;! 2 . Since
The agent's value function in the CM is rearranged as
The …rst order condition with respect to x is
The subscript x represents the partial derivative with respect to x: Note that the optimal x depends on (q ! ; q!; Q ! ; Q!). That is, the choice of x in the CM generally depends on the terms of trade as arguments have been used by Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) . Burdett et al. (2001) show that this method can be justi…ed by considering equilibria in a version of the model with …nite numbers of buyers and sellers and then taking the limit as the economy gets large.
well as the probability of trading in both ! and!. Let x b (!;!) be the solution to (14). This is the optimal x for an agent who chooses submarket ! conditional on being a buyer and chooses! conditional on being a seller.
Now consider an agent who is a seller in !. Before the preference shock is realized, the agent can potentially go to submarket! if he becomes a buyer with probability . By similar arguments, the CM value function of an agent who is a seller in ! is rewritten as
and the …rst order condition with respect to x is
Let x s (!; !) be the optimal x for an agent who is a seller in !. As described earlier, for each ! 2 , market makers maximize the CM value function of a future buyer such that a future seller can get the equilibrium expected value J. For ease of notations, I de…ne the following two terms.
Ignoring the terms that do not depend on (q ! ; d ! ), the problem of a market maker who designs ! is
where
p+ . The interpretation of the constraint (20) is that the market tightness Q ! should adjust to ensure that each seller gets the market value J.
In the steady state, the in ‡ation rate is Since I focus on the determination of the terms of trade in submarket !, I now omit the subscript ! without any confusion. The unconstrained problem for the market maker is
Notice that from (14) and (16), (1 )
. The …rst order conditions for interior solutions are
Here the subscript q or Q represents the partial derivative with respect to q or Q.
De…nition 1 A competitive search equilibrium is a list (q ! ; Q ! ; d ! ; S ! ) and a J 0 such that given J, (q ! ; Q ! ; d ! ; S ! ) maximize the expected value of a buyer subject to the constraint that a seller gets J, where J satis…es P S ! = 1 and
Before establishing the existence of competitive search equilibrium, I characterize the …rst best allocation (q ; x ;` ) in the appendix as the benchmark allocation. In what follows, I focus on equilibrium where there is a unique submarket open. 7 It implies that
In addition, b and s are constants where
7 Let Q(J) be the solution of Q as a function of J. Here Q(J) is decreasing in J. In equilibrium, 1 belongs to the convext hull of Q(J). In general, one 1 may admit multiple J. When Q(J) is strictly decreasing in J, there is a unique J in equilibrium. In this case, one J may correspond to multiple Q in competitive search equilibrium and hence there could be multiple submarkets open. However, one can add additional assumptions to ensure that there is a unique submarket. See Dong (forthcoming) for an example. and s (Q) = s ( 1 ). For interior solutions, (q; x) are solved from
When designing submarkets, market makers take J as given. However, J adjusts to clear the market in equilibrium. Mathematically, (24) determines J and hence J. Finally, d p+ is obtained from (21).
Proposition 1
In competitive search equilibrium, the optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule.
Proof. It is easy to check that when i ! 0, (q; x) that solve (25) and (26) are the same as the planner's choice.
Given that there is no policy distortion, competitive search equilibrium endogenously generates the e¢ cient allocation. In RRW, the Friedman rule is also the optimal monetary policy. The di¤erence between the bargaining equilibrium in RRW and the competitive search equilibrium here is that sellers get 0 trading surplus in RRW, whereas buyers and sellers split the trading surplus in competitive search equilibrium.
Proposition 2
Monetary equilibrium exists when the in ‡ation rate is not too high. In addition, . When i exceeds {, q = 0 and monetary equilibrium does not exist.
Having de…ned monetary equilibrium, I proceed to …nd the conditions that guarantee`2 (0; 1).
Since utility is separable in (q; x) and h, from (7)
It is obvious that`decreases in m. It means that agents entering into the CM with more money balances work with lower probability. When a unique submarket opens in the DM, agents'money balances can take three possible values upon exiting the DM. For unmatched agents, they still hold m. For matched buyers, they end up with 0 unit of money, while for matched sellers, they accumulate 2m units of money. In the steady state,m = (1 + )M . It follows that
where the subscript " " represents variables in the previous period. To ensure that`2 (0; 1), one needs`m ax < 1 and`m in > 0. The condition reduces to
Notice that M p is endogenously determined in (21). As discussed in RRW, it should not be hard to …nd parameters such that`is interior. So the rest of the paper assumes that`2 (0; 1).
In ‡ation and Unemployment
Given the equilibrium conditions, this subsection examines how in ‡ation a¤ects unemployment.
When the in ‡ation rate increases, it usually distorts transactions in the DM where money is used in exchange. With nonseparable preferences, however, it is not obvious how in ‡ation a¤ects the activities in the CM.
I …rst assume that only buyers have nonseparable preferences in (q; x) as in RRW. Di¤erentiating (25) and (26) with respect to i
where I use the de…nition of u(q; x) and c(q; x). Let a ' b denote a and b are equal in sign.
Proposition 3
In competitive search equilibrium,
Proof. From (28),
It is common that in ‡ation reduces the consumption of the DM good in monetary search models.
One interesting result is that in ‡ation may increase or decrease the consumption of the CM good or unemployment depending on the sign of f qx ( q + q; x). As in RRW,
> 0 if q and x are complements. When q decreases, x also decreases. Since x is produced in the CM, in ‡ation increases unemployment. If q and x are substitutes,
< 0 and hence in ‡ation reduces unemployment. It is straightforward that if buyers'preferences are also separable in q and x, in ‡ation does not a¤ect unemployment.
In competitive search equilibrium, in ‡ation increases unemployment if x and q are complements and in ‡ation reduces unemployment if x and q are substitutes. The result is the same as in RRW and it holds true in competitive search equilibrium. There is no need to resort to an extreme case as in bargaining equilibrium.
Extensions
Nonseparable Preferences for Sellers
In RRW, only buyers are assumed to have nonseparable preferences. It is easy to allow both buyers and sellers to have nonseparable preferences in competitive search equilibrium. It turns out that the main results in RRW have to be modi…ed.
Proposition 4
When both buyers and sellers have nonseparable preferences in (x; q),
Proof. Modifying (27) and (28) as
Similar to the proof of proposition 2, dq di < 0 and
When both buyers and sellers have nonseparable preferences, there are several cases to consider.
First, if q and x are complements for both buyers and sellers, then the sign of
depends on f qx ( q + q; x) F qx (; x). The e¤ect of in ‡ation on unemployment is ambiguous. Second, if q and x are substitutes for both buyers and sellers, the sign of
is also ambiguous. Third, if q and x are complements for buyers but substitutes for sellers, I have
> 0 and in ‡ation increases unemployment. Finally, if q and x are substitutes for buyers and complements for sellers,
and in ‡ation reduces unemployment. It is trivial to check that if only sellers have nonseparable preferences in q and x, in ‡ation increases unemployment if q and x are substitutes, and in ‡ation reduces unemployment if q and x are complements. If only buyers have nonseparable preferences in q and x, this is the case discussed in the previous section.
The above results are very intuitive. Take the case where q and x are substitutes for both buyers and sellers as an example. In ‡ation reduces q, which means that the consumption of q decreases for buyers, but increases for sellers. Since q and x are substitutes, the consumption of x should increase for buyers, but should decrease for sellers. Since agents do not know whether they become buyers or sellers in the CM, the overall e¤ect of in ‡ation on x is ambiguous. Hence, the overall e¤ect of in ‡ation on unemployment is ambiguous. However, if q and x are substitutes for buyers and complements for sellers, a lower q implies a higher x for both buyers and sellers. Therefore, in ‡ation must reduce unemployment. Allowing sellers to have nonseparable preferences alters the results in RRW, but the intuition remains the same. The key point is that in ‡ation may have di¤erent e¤ects on buyers and sellers in the sector where money is essential. In the case where both buyers and sellers consume (x; q) as complements (or substitutes), in ‡ation has opposite e¤ects on buyers and sellers.
Free Entry by Sellers
As discussed previously, competitive search equilibrium endogenizes how buyers and sellers split the trading surplus. It further allows one to add ex ante investment or entry/exit decisions by sellers.
In this subsection, I extend the environment to allow free entry by sellers. Market makers still post terms of trade at the beginning of each period. After seeing the postings, an agent can make a decision as follows. He can choose a submarket ! if he becomes a buyer in the DM. If he is a seller in the DM, he can choose to go to submarket! or not to go to any submarket at all. The cost of entry into any submarket for sellers is k.
To facilitate comparisons with RRW, I allow only buyers to have nonseparable preferences. Sellers' preferences are u s (q; x; h) = F (q) + G(x) + v(h); where standard assumptions of utility functions apply on F (q) and G(x). I assume that is such that Q ! is not constrained for any !. In aggregate, the measure of sellers is endogenously determined. Based on this modi…cation, a market maker designs submarket ! so that it maximizes the surplus of a buyer who enters this submarket subject to the constraint that a seller always gets surplus k from entering into the submarket.
Formally, the market maker's problem is
One can follow similar steps as in the previous section to solve the unconstrained maximization problem by substituting d p+ from the constraint into the objective function. The equilibrium (q; Q) are characterized by
Again, I focus on equilibrium where there is a unique submarket open.
Proposition 5
In competitive search equilibrium with free entry,
Proof. See the appendix.
It appears that allowing free entry by sellers does not alter the qualitative relationship between in ‡ation and unemployment. When Q is a¤ected by in ‡ation, the choice of x depends on (q; Q).
As usual, in ‡ation reduces q in the DM, which lowers per trade surplus in the DM. This intensive margin e¤ect may increase or decrease x depending whether q and x are complements or substitutes in much the same way as before. Free entry by sellers generates the extensive margin e¤ect on x as follows. When there are less sellers (i.e., Q increases), the number of trades decreases in the DM.
Recall that u x = f x (q + q; x) f x ( q; x). If q and x are complements, having more x is bene…cial for buyers and hence less trades in the DM reduces the marginal bene…t of x. A higher Q leads to a lower x. If q and x are substitutes, more x reduces a buyer's utility and hence less trades in the DM raises the marginal bene…t of x. A higher Q leads to a higher x. Mathematically, the extensive margin e¤ect does not change how x depends on i.
Conclusion
This The …rst order conditions for interior solutions are: :`=`x 1 + (1 `)x 0 :
for h 2 f0; 1g. Notice that (35) and (36) determine (x h ; q h ). One can prove that the planner's problem is concave. It follows that the solution must be unique, which implies that x 1 = x 0 and q 1 = q 0 . Denoting x 1 = x 0 = x and q 1 = q 0 = q, (37) and (38) 
A. Consider the unconstrained problem of market makers. The second order condition with respect to Q is A23A32 A33
A 22 . Given that the optimal Q should be interior,
A23A32 A33
A 22 < 0 at the optimal solution and hence A 32 A 23 A 33 A 22 > 0. To summarize, dx di ' u xq (q; x) ' f xq ( q + q; x). So
